The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry....

Forward looking agents with expectational errors provide a problem for monetary policy. We show that under such conditions a standard interest rate rule may not achieve determinacy. We suggest a modification to the standard policy rule that guarantees determinacy in this setting, which involves...

We consider an exchange economy in which there are infinitely many consumers and some commodities are bads, that is, cause disutility to consumers. We give an example of such an economy for which there is no competitive equilibrium or its variants (quasi- or psuedo-equilibrium). We also give...

In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit stepfunction offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the purestrategy, Nash...

The assumption of perfectly rational representative agents is commonly questioned. This paper explores the equilibrium properties of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents. We combine an adaptive learning process in a modified cobweb model within a Stackleberg framework. We assume that there is...

Supply Function Equilibria (SFE) offer an attractive equilibrium concept for an electricity Pool in which all suppliers receive the market clearing price and are an important tool for examining market power. It is helpful to have analytical solutions available for simple models to explore market...

This paper studies a game theoretic model where agents choose between two updating rules to predict a future endogenous variable. Agents rationally choose between these predictors based on relative performance. Conditions for evolutionary stability and stability under learning are found for the...

We study the properties of generalized stochastic gradient (GSG) learning in forwardlooking models. We examine how the conditions for stability of standard stochastic gradient (SG) learning both di1er from and are related to E-stability, which governs stability under least squares learning. SG...

CWPE0619 (EPRG0602) Xinmin Hu and Daniel Ralph (Feb 2006) Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal prices. Each player faces a bilevel...