We study incumbency advantage in a dynamic game with incomplete information between an incumbent and a voter. The incumbent knows the true state of the world, e.g., the severity of an economic recession or the level of criminal activities, and can choose the quality of his policy. This quality...

This paper develops a theory of policy myopia. Policy myopia arises when rational voters set performance standards that allow elected politicians to distort the portfolio of public investments towards short-term investments. We show that the fact that voters cannot observe immediately how much...

No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political...

We study the joint determination of corruption and economic growth. Our model can generate multiple equilibria when complementarity between corruption and growth is sufficiently strong. Our estimates of the impact of corruption on growth take into account that corruption is endogenous and that...

Domestic climate policies play an important part in shifting countries towards a low-carbon development trajectory. Six case studies explore the domestic drivers and barriers for policies with climate (co-)benefits in developing countries. International support can help to overcome these...

This paper shows a core-equilibrium convergence in a public goods economy where consumers' preferences display warm glow effects. We demonstrate that if each consumer becomes satiated to other consumers' provision, then as the economy grows large the core shrinks to the set of Edgeworth...

This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with political corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalisation implies free entry and allocative efficiency and is supported by a majority of voters. Voters...

This paper presents an argument in favor of foreign lobbying. We show how foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities and promote social objectives.

This paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying. We show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities. We argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying. We also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign...