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Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games and Negotiation

Lee, J.; Sabourian, H. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004

This paper considers the ‘negotiation game’ (Busch and Wen [4]) which combines the features of two-person alternating offers and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibria, some of which involve delay in agreement and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489319

Determinants of Investment under Incentive Regulation: The Case of Norwegian Electricity Distribution Networks

Poudineh, R.; Jamasb, T. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2013

Investment in electricity networks, as regulated natural monopolies, is among the highest regulatory and energy policy … electricity sector, identifying investment drivers of power networks facilitates effective regulatory treatment of investment … under incentive regulation. This study analyses the determinants of investment in Norwegian electricity distribution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729016

Third Party Nuclear Liability: The Case of a Supplier in the United Kingdom

Thomas, A.; Heffron, R. J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2012

nuclear liability, and in particular, in relation to a Supplier in the nuclear energy sector in the United Kingdom (UK). The … term “Supplier” is used in this paper and, depending on the context, is intended to cover all parties in the supply chain … to nuclear new build expected in the UK, the clarification of the position of a Supplier and their potential to be liable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651253

The Direct Costs and Benefits of US Electric Utility Divestitures

Triebs, T.P.; Pollitt, M.G.; Kwoka, J.E. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2010

This paper studies the impact of divestiture on the efficiency and costs of electric utilities. The empirical literature shows that there exist economies of scope for electric utilities and that divestiture decreases distribution efficiency but increases generation efficiency. This paper is to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673578

Communication networks in markets

Gallo, Edoardo - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2014

This paper proposes a dynamic model of bargaining to analyze decentralized markets where buyers and sellers obtain information about past deals through their social network. There is a unique equilibrium outcome which depends crucially on the peripheral (least connected) individuals in each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010890020

Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Transfers.

Baliga, S.; Evans, R. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 1996

We consider repeated games with transferable utility: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the comon discount factor high enough, then a trongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113831

From State Factory, to Modern Corporation? China's Shougang Iron and Steel Corporation Under Economic Reform.

Nolan, P. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 1996

The main body of the paper analyses the reasons and the nature of Corporation's remarkable growth during the economic reform years since the late 1970s in China.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207819

Reputation and Punishment in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players.

Evans, R.; Thomas, J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207836

Contracting for wind generation

Newbery, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2011

The UK Government proposes offering long-term Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs) to low-carbon generation to reduce risk and encourage new entrants. Their preference is for a Contract-for-Difference (CfD) or a premium FiT (pFiT) for all generation regardless of type. I argue that neither is suitable for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009207388

Information, Reputation and Ethnic Conflict

Rohner, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2006

Empirical studies have found ethnic cleavages to play an important role in the occurrence of civil conflict. Surprisingly, theoretical research on ethnic con.ict has been very scarce. In the present contribution a theoretical model of reputation and ethnic conflict is built. Depending on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489352