CWPE0619 (EPRG0602) Xinmin Hu and Daniel Ralph (Feb 2006) Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal prices. Each player faces a bilevel...

This paper explores optimal treatment of an SIS (Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible) disease that has two strains with di¤erent infectivities. When we assume that neither eradication nor full infection are possible, it is shown that there are two categories of equilibria. First, there are two...

Solving dynamic models with inequality constraints poses a challenging problem for two major reasons: dynamic programming techniques are reliable but often slow, while Euler equation based methods are fast but have problematic or unknown convergence properties. This paper attempts to bridge this...

This paper uses a bi-level game to model markets for delivery of electrical power on looped transmission networks. It analyzes the effectiveness of an independent system operator (ISO) when generators (and, in some cases, retailers) with market power bid a single parameter of their linear supply...

We re-connect money to in.ation using Goodfriend and McCallum's (2007) model where banks supply loans to cash-in-advance constrained consumers on the basis of the value of collateral provided and the monitoring skills of banks. We show that when shocks to monitoring and collateral dominate those...

In the evolutionary setting for a financial market developed by Blume and Easley (1992) the author considers an infinitely repeated version of a model B la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) with asymmetrically informed traders. Informed traders observe the realisation of a payoff relevant signal...

The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry....

Forward looking agents with expectational errors provide a problem for monetary policy. We show that under such conditions a standard interest rate rule may not achieve determinacy. We suggest a modification to the standard policy rule that guarantees determinacy in this setting, which involves...

We consider an exchange economy in which there are infinitely many consumers and some commodities are bads, that is, cause disutility to consumers. We give an example of such an economy for which there is no competitive equilibrium or its variants (quasi- or psuedo-equilibrium). We also give...