The need for investment in capital intensive electricity networks is on the rise in many countries. A major advantage of distributed resources is their potential for deferring investments in distribution network capacity. However, utilizing the full benefits of these resources requires...

This paper attempts to assess the social welfare impact of the restructuring and privatisation of the electricity market in Peru. The target companies, Electrolima and Electro Sur Medio, account for 64 per cent of the total distribution market and 100 per cent of the privatised distribution...

This paper uses a bi-level game to model markets for delivery of electrical power on looped transmission networks. It analyzes the effectiveness of an independent system operator (ISO) when generators (and, in some cases, retailers) with market power bid a single parameter of their linear supply...

CWPE0619 (EPRG0602) Xinmin Hu and Daniel Ralph (Feb 2006) Using EPECs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with locational prices We study a bilevel noncooperative game-theoretic model of electricity markets with locational marginal prices. Each player faces a bilevel...

This paper argues that electricity market reform – particularly the need for complementary mechanisms to remunerate capacity – need to be analysed in the light of the local regulatory and institutional environment. If there is a lack of investment, the priority should be to identify the...

The paper studies how risks specific to a nuclear power investment in liberalised markets – regulatory, construction, operation and market risks – can be mitigated or transferred away from the plant investor through different contractual and organisational arrangements. It argues that...