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Reputation and Punishment in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players.

Evans, R.; Thomas, J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207836

Loyalty for Sale? Military Spending and Coups d'Etat

Leon, G. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2012

Coups d'etat continue to be common around the world, often leading to changes in leaders and institutions. We examine the relationship between military spending and coups and find that (i) successful coups increase military spending by more than failed attempts, and (ii) coups are more likely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651255

Group Decision-Making: An Economic Analysis of Social Influence and Individual Difference in Experimental Juries

Parkinson, S.; Baddeley, M. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2011

for non-rational reasons, such as a preference for conformity or due to erroneous information, then the final decision of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024884

Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

Jennings, C. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2011

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence in situations where violence does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024888

Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures

Aidt, T.S.; Shvets, J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2011

We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage individual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024899

Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass

Bierbrauer, F.J.; Boyer, F.J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2011

We study Downsian competition in a Mirrleesian model of income taxation. The competing politicians may dier in competence. If politicians engage in vote-share maximization, the less competent politician's policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents, whereas those of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024904

Knowledge is power: A theory of information, income and welfare spending

Lind, J.T.; Rohner, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2011

No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better … informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of …. In US election survey data, we find that income is more important in affecting voting behavior for more informed voters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352236

Corruption and Sustainable Development

Aidt, T.S. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2010

This paper studies the relationship between corruption and sustainable development in a sample of 110 countries between 1996 and 2007. Sustainability is measured by growth in genuine wealth per capita. The empirical analysis consistently finds that cross-national measures of perceived and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727347

The Golden Hello and Political Transitions

Toke, A.S.; Albornoz, F.; Gassebner, M. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2012

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699803

Why High Human Capital Makes Good Revolutionaries: The Role of the Middle Classes in Democratisation

Toscani, Frederik - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2013

This paper studies how human capital affects agents' tendency to participate in revolutions and consequently political outcomes. We show that since human capital is not expropriatable in the way land or other assets are, revolutions are more attractive if human capital is an important source of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010700214