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Modelling Experience as Signal Accumulation

Sgroi, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2002

Experience gained in a workplace characterised by decision-making and learning-by-doing is modelled via a process of signal accumulation under several different frameworks. We initially look at the probability of success based on uninterrupted signal accumulation, then consider the impact of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783765

Product Launches with Biased Reviewers: The Importance of Not Being Earnest

Gill, D.; Sgroi, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2003

The standard simple sequential herding model is altered to allow a firm with a new product to have it reviewed publicly before launch. Reviewers are either inherently pessimistic, optimistic or unbiased. We find the counter-intuitive result that a firm with a good product will prefer a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783848

Herding And Social Pressure In Trading Tasks: A Behavioural Analysis

Baddeley, M.; Pillas, D.; Christopoulos, Y.; Schultz, W.; … - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2007

We extend the experimental literature on Bayesian herding using evidence from a financial decision-making experiment. We identify significant propensities to herd increasing with the degree of herd-consensus. We test various herding models to capture the differential impacts of Bayesian-style...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113886

Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games and Negotiation

Lee, J.; Sabourian, H. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004

This paper considers the ‘negotiation game’ (Busch and Wen [4]) which combines the features of two-person alternating offers and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibria, some of which involve delay in agreement and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489319

Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Transfers.

Baliga, S.; Evans, R. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 1996

We consider repeated games with transferable utility: players have an endowment of wealth in each period in which transfers can be made. We show that if endowments are large enough and the comon discount factor high enough, then a trongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (SRP) in the sense of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113831

Pro-competitive rationing in multi-unit auctions

Holmberg, Pär - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2014

In multi-unit auctions, such as auctions of commodities and securities, and financial exchanges, it is necessary to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010949356

The Role of Distribution Network Operators in Promoting Cost-Effective Distributed Generation: Lessons from the United States for Europe

Anaya, Karim L.; Pollitt, Michael G. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2014

for Proposals (RFP) and auctions (Renewable Auction Mechanism). The study proposes an auction design with a focus on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011262880

Security of Supply, Capacity Auctions and Interconnectors

Newbery, David - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2015

annual capacity auctions. The paper examines the case for, criticisms of, and the outcome of the first auction, criticizing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265354

The Supply Function Equilibrium and its Policy Implications for Wholesale Electricity Auctions

Holmberg, P.; Newbery, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2010

electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the …-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format, setting the reservation price, the rationing rule, and … restrictions on the offer curves in wholesale electricity auctions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008503180

Determining the optimal length of regulatory guarantee: A Length-of-Contract Auction

Greve, Thomas; Pollitt, Michael G. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2013

motivated by the auctions currently being undertaken by the UK energy regulator (Ofgem) for financing offshore transmission …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737347