This paper uses a bi-level game to model markets for delivery of electrical power on looped transmission networks. It analyzes the effectiveness of an independent system operator (ISO) when generators (and, in some cases, retailers) with market power bid a single parameter of their linear supply...

This paper analyses the economics of long-term gas contracts under changing institutional conditions, mainly gas sector liberalisation. The paper is motivated by the increasingly tense debate in continental Europe, UK and the US on the security of long-term gas supply. We discuss the main issues...

The paper surveys the literature and publicly available information on market power monitoring in electricity wholesale markets. After briefly reviewing definitions, strategies and methods of mitigating market power we examine the various methods of detecting market power that have been employed...

Numerical models for electricity markets are frequently used to inform and support decisions. How robust are the results? Three research groups used the same, realistic data set for generators, demand and transmission network as input for their numerical models. The results coincide when...

Privatisation of utilities is about ownership rather than control. Liberalisation can induce greather improvements in performance than privatisation alone. Regulation id inevitably inefficient, and adequately competitive network services may improve efficiency. History indicates that regulated...

Britain was the exemplar of electricity market reform, demonstrating the importance of ownership unbundling and workable competition in generation and supply. Privatisation created de facto duopolies that supported increasing price-cost margins and induced excessive (English) entry....

This paper presents substantial new evidence on the competitive process that links together industrial economic and international economics. Our time-series data base concerns manufactured product prices and their domestic and international determinants. We identity cointegrating relationships,...

How to treat transmission constraints in electricity markets that are not based on a pool but on bilateral trading? Three approaches are currently discussed: First, the system operator resolves constraints and socialises costs; second, physical transmission contracts; third, locational charging...

What would happen if firms could collusively choose cost of transport (inconvenience) in Hotelling's spatial model? This paper endogenises inconvenience in a three stage game, where firms choose locations, the inconvenience, and finally compete in price, on the assumption of a common reservation...

It is difficult to elminated all market power in electricity markets and it is therefore frequently suggested that some market power should be tolerated: extra revenues contribute to fixed cost recovery, facilitate investment and increase security of supply. This suggestion implicitly assumes...