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The Hunter Valley Access Undertaking: elements of a negotiated settlement
Bordignon, S.; Littlechild, S. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2012
On 29 June 2011 the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) accepted an access undertaking from Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) in relation to the Hunter Valley rail network. The ACCC encouraged ARTC and its users (principally coal producers) to discuss and negotiate the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010699823
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Assessing the efficient cost of sustaining Britain’s rail network: perspectives based on Zonal comparisons
Kennedy, J.; Smith, A.S.J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2003
The objective of this paper is to inform the debate on how efficiency targets for Network Rail (formerly Railtrack) should be set during the 2002/03 Interim Review and beyond. Given the problems experienced during the 2000 Periodic Review, which focused on external benchmarks, we propose an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113822
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The Process of Negotiating Settlements at FERC
Littlechild, S. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2011
Interstate gas pipelines and their customers presently settle about 90% of the rate cases set for hearing before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In recent years, the median time for negotiating settlements and having them approved is about 11 months, compared to several years to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024908
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Determinants of Investment under Incentive Regulation: The Case of Norwegian Electricity Distribution Networks
Poudineh, R.; Jamasb, T. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2013
under incentive regulation. This study analyses the determinants of investment in Norwegian electricity distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729016
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Regulatory Threat in Vertically Related Markets; The Case of German Electricity
Brunekreeft, G. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2002
contrast to other European member states, there is no ex-ante regulation of network access charges. Instead, network access … relies on industrial self-regulation and ex-post control by the Cartel Office. The paper modifies the concept of regulatory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783729
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‘UK domestic energy contracts, the 28 day rule, and experience in Sweden’
Littlechild, S. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004
In the UK, domestic customers must be able to terminate energy contracts at 28 days’ notice. This has been seen as a transitional protection for customers and for competition. This paper reviews the arguments for and against the 28 day rule, and examines the extent to which UK suppliers have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783746
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Regulation of transmission expansion in Argentina Part II: Developments since the Fourth Line
Littlechild, S.C.; Skerk, C.J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004
the regulation of monopoly networks is feasible, and the scope for it may be greater than generally appreciated. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783769
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Competitive Bidding for a Long-term Electricity Distribution Contract
Littlechild, S.C. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2001
Demsetz (1968) advocated competitive bidding as a replacement for natural monopoly regulation. Williamson (1976) and … Goldberg (1976) argued that these problems of natural monopoly regulation are inherent in long-term investment under … uncertainty, and that both long- and short-term franchising contracts may be more problematic than regulation. Williams …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783770
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Regulation of transmission expansion in Argentina Part I: State ownership, reform and the Fourth Line
Littlechild, S.C.; Skerk, C.J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2004
From 1992 to 2002, major expansions of the Argentine electricity transmission sector depended on users proposing, voting and paying for such expansions, which were then put out to competitive tender. Commentators hold this novel policy to have been unsuccessful, mainly on the ground that it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783838
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Should Merchant Transmission Investment be Subject to a Must-offer Provision?
Brunekreeft, G.; Newbery, D. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2005
Merchant electricity transmission investment is a practically relevant example of an unregulated investment with monopoly properties. However, while leaving the investment decision to the market, the regulator may decide to prohibit capacity withholding with a must-offer provision. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783840