Private placement debt issues are more effective than public bonds in resolving information asymmetries and controlling moral hazard problems. Firms that issue only private placements (non-switchers) are found to have more information problems than firms that have access to the public bond...

Most studies of corporate investment assume perfect capital markets and ignore the influence of financing decisions on real investment. This paper explores whether capital market imperfections are helpful in explaining real corporate investment. I develop a variant of a q-theory model of...

In this paper we formulate and test a number of hypotheses regarding insurer participation and volume decisions in derivatives markets. Several specific hypotheses are supported by our analysis. We find evidence consistent with the idea that insurers are motivated to use financial derivatives to...

We study the macroeconomic implications of the debt overhang distortion. In our model, the distortion arises because investment is non-contractible—when a firm borrows funds, the debt contract cannot specify or depend on the firm’s future level of investment. After the debt contract is...

I perform an empirical analysis of Euler equations for the firm's choices of capital, labor, hours, and debt. Financial structure has real effects , since taxes favor debt. However, the cost of debt increases with the debt-to-collateral ratio, and capital is part of collateral. The data, for...

This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative...

We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal...

An analysis of a q model of investment in which financial structure affects firm value, using a perfect foresight model of general equilibrium that includes a debt-related agency cost; uses the comparative statics and dynamics of changing the corporate tax rate as an illustration.

Using a principal-agent model in which an entrepreneur has an investment project whose returns depend on his effort, which is not observable by the financier, the author shows that the optimal contract used to finance such a project can be replicated by a unique combination of debt and equity,...