We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal...

This paper models, and experimentally simulates, the free-rider problem in a takeover when the raider has the option to “resolicit,” that is, to make a new offer after an offer has been rejected. In theory, the option to resolicit, by lowering offer credibility, increases the dissipative...

The Federal Reserve has made significant changes in its predisposition to release information over time. This paper reports the results of experimental asset markets designed to investigate how the public disclosure of uncertain information affects market and individual outcomes. In one set of...

We provide substantial evidence that the futures market for West Texas Intermediate crude oil increased the short-term volatility of the cash price of crude oil. We show that the variability of prices increased using both published posted prices and transaction prices for producers. This...

In this paper we examine integration between emerging and U.S. debt and equity markets. We first investigate price changes around significant "events," in this case changes in short-term U.S. interest rates brought about by actions of the Federal Reserve. Second, we estimate the predictability...

We employ a parametric rational expectations equilibrium model to study the impact of public information releases on private information acquisition and asset prices in a large economy. We demonstrate that investors treat public information as a substitute for privately acquired information....

This paper models an economy in which managers, whose efforts affect firm performance, are able to make "inside" trades on claims whose value is also dependent on firm performance. Managers are able to trade only on "good news," that is, on returns above market expectations. Further, managers...

In this paper we show, in an incomplete contracts framework that combines asymmetric information and moral hazard, that by permitting insiders to trade on personal account the equilibrium level of output can be increased and shareholder welfare can be improved. There are two reasons for this....