Conventional wisdom suggests that medium-term money neutrality imposes strong limitations on the effects of monetary policy. The point of this paper is that models with medium- and long-term money neutrality are prone to generate non-existence of equilibria at the effective lower bound (ELB) on...

This paper presents a toolkit to solve for equilibrium in economies with the effective lower bound (ELB) on the nominal interest rate in a computationally efficient way under a special assumption about the underlying shock process, a two-state Markov process with an absorbing state. We...

In previous work (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003), we characterized the optimal conduct of monetary policy when a real disturbance causes the natural rate of interest to be temporarily negative, so that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binds, and showed that commitment to a...

We consider the consequences for monetary policy of the zero floor for nominal interest rates. The zero bound can be a significant constraint on the ability of a central bank to combat deflation. We show, in the context of an intertemporal equilibrium model, that open-market operations, even of...

We examine to what extent variants of inflation-forecast targeting can avoid stabilization bias, incorporate history-dependence, and achieve determinancy of equilibrium, so as to reproduce a socially optimal equilibrium. We also evaluate these variants in terms of the transparency of the...

Monetary policy can achieve average inflation equal to a given inflation target and, at best, a good compromise between inflation variability and output-gap variability. Monetary policy cannot completely stabilize either inflation or the output gap. Increased credibility in the form of inflation...

This paper proves a certainty equivalence result for optimal policy under commitment with symmetric partial information about the state of the economy in a model with forward-looking variables. This result is used in our previous paper, Indicator Variables for Optimal Policy,' which synthesizes...

It is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule, either a general targeting rule (explicit objectives for monetary policy) or a specific targeting rule (a criterion for (the forecasts of) the target variables to be...

Policy rules that are consistent with inflation targeting are examined in a small macroeconomic model of the US economy. We compare the properties and outcomes of explicit instrument rules' as well as targeting rules.' The latter, which imply implicit instrument rules, may be closer to actual...

We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...