Presentation by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for The Institute of Regulation and Risk North Asia, Hong Kong, May 5, 2009

Dishonest acts are all too prevalent in day-to-day life. In the current review, we examine some possible psychological causes for such dishonesty that go beyond the standard economic considerations of probability and value of external payoffs. We propose a general model of dishonest behavior...

The authors extend the standard public goods game in a variety of ways, in particular by allowing for endogenous preference over institutions and by studying the relationship between individual types, their preferences, and later behavior within the various institutional environments. They...

Presented by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at the ICBI RiskMinds 2008 Conference: The Global Risk Regulation Summit, Geneva, Switzerland, December 8, 2008

Presentation by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for a Panel Discussion at the Conference on Financial Markets and Monetary Policy, Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Washington, D.C.,...

Remarks by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, to the Financial Stability Institute, Bank for International Settlements, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 24, 2011

Presented by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for the Institute of International Bankers Annual Washington Conference, Washington, DC, March 2, 2009

Presentation by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for “Rethinking Central Banking” Conference, Washington, D.C., October 10, 2010

We find that a relatively large number of banks active in the derivatives market have low capital ratios and are considered institutions with a significant risk of failure by bank supervisors. However, we also find no evidence that the volume of derivatives activity at troubled banks affects the...

Greater transparency and disclosure of bank activities will not prevent banking crises unless appropriate monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies are also adopted. Nonetheless, greater disclosure of banking problems can reduce the costs of banking crises, even if transparency is not a panacea...