This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

The Barro-Gordon inflation bias has provided the most influential argument for fixed exchange rate regimes. However, with low inflation rates now widespread, credibility concerns seem no longer relevant. Why give up independent monetary policy to contain an inflation bias that is already under...

Remarks at the ACI 2010 World Congress, Sydney, Australia.

Remarks at 2010 CFA Institute Fixed Income Management Conference, Newport Beach, California.

Remarks at the National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference, Arlington, Virginia

Remarks at Global Interdependence Center Central Banking Series Event, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

Remarks by Brian P. Sack before the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City.

Remarks at the Annual Meeting with Primary Dealers, New York City.

We argue that there are conditions such that any inflation targeting regime is preferable to full policy discretion, even if long-run inflation rates are identical across regimes. The key observation is that strict inflation targeting outperforms the discretionary policy response to sufficiently...