This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

In a two-country DSGE model, the effects of foreign demand shocks on the home country are greatly amplified if the home economy is constrained by the zero lower bound for policy interest rates. This result applies even to countries that are relatively closed to trade such as the United States....

Remarks at the ACI 2010 World Congress, Sydney, Australia.

Remarks at 2010 CFA Institute Fixed Income Management Conference, Newport Beach, California.

Remarks at the National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference, Arlington, Virginia

Remarks at Global Interdependence Center Central Banking Series Event, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

Remarks by Brian P. Sack before the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City.

Remarks at the Annual Meeting with Primary Dealers, New York City.

This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

Lack of commitment in monetary policy leads to the well known Barro-Gordon inflation bias. In this paper, we argue that two phenomena associated with the time inconsistency problem have been overlooked in the exchange rate debate. We show that, absent commitment, independent monetary policy can...