This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

Remarks at the ACI 2010 World Congress, Sydney, Australia.

Remarks at 2010 CFA Institute Fixed Income Management Conference, Newport Beach, California.

Remarks at the National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference, Arlington, Virginia

Remarks at Global Interdependence Center Central Banking Series Event, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.

Remarks by Brian P. Sack before the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City.

Remarks at the Annual Meeting with Primary Dealers, New York City.

Statements released by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and congressional testimony by Chairman Greenspan are found to significantly affect market interest rates, indicating that central bank "talk" conveys important information to market participants. These effects arise not only...

This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

The perceptions of a central bank's inflation aversion may reflect institutional structure or, more dynamically, the history of its policy decisions. In this paper, we present a novel empirical framework that uses high-frequency data to test for persistent variation in market perceptions of...