In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...

Pt. 1. The macroeconomics of capital flows to Latin America, experience and policy issues / Michael Gavin, Ricardo Hausmann, and Leonardo Leiderman. Commentary / Michael Bruno ... [et al.]. Conclusion to Part 1 / Jacob Frenkel -- Pt. 2. Achieving stability in Latin American financial markets in...

We examine the implications of time variation in the correlation between the equity premium and nondurable consumption growth for equity return dynamics in G-7 countries. Using a VAR-GARCH (1,1) model, we find that the correlation increases with recession indicators such as above-average...