Foreign bank entrants into emerging markets are usually thought to improve the condition and performance of acquired institutions, and more generally to enhance local financial stability. We use bank-specific data for a range of Latin American countries since the mid-1990s to address elements of...

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...

The goal of integrated risk management in a financial institution is to measure and manage risk and capital across a range of diverse business activities. This requires an approach for aggregating risk types (market, credit, and operational) whose distributional shapes vary considerably. In this...

Remarks at the Global Association of Risk Professionals 12th Annual Risk Management Convention, New York City.

Remarks at the Eighth Annual BIS Conference, Basel, Switzerland.

Remarks at the Partnership for New York City Discussion, New York City.

Remarks at the Council of Society Business Economists Annual Dinner, London, United Kingdom.

Testimony of Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., and Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel of the Board of Governors, before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Remarks at the Third Annual Connecticut Bank and Trust Company Economic Outlook Breakfast, Hartford, Connecticut.