In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...

In responding to the severity and broad scope of the financial crisis that began in 2007, the Federal Reserve has made aggressive use of both traditional monetary policy instruments and innovative tools in an effort to provide liquidity. In this paper, I examine the Fed's actions in light of the...

Remarks at the New York Bankers Association Financial Services Forum, New York City.

Remarks at the Eighth Annual BIS Conference, Basel, Switzerland.

Remarks at the Partnership for New York City Discussion, New York City.

Remarks at the Center for Transnational Legal Studies Seminar on the Impact of U.S. Regulatory Reform on Global Banks, New York City.

Remarks at the Council of Society Business Economists Annual Dinner, London, United Kingdom.

Remarks at the Foreign Policy Association Corporate Dinner, New York City