In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...

The goal of integrated risk management in a financial institution is to measure and manage risk and capital across a range of diverse business activities. This requires an approach for aggregating risk types (market, credit, and operational) whose distributional shapes vary considerably. In this...

Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage market, with important consequences for household risk management, monetary policy, and systemic risk. In this paper, we show that securitization is a key driver of FRM supply. Our analysis compares the agency and nonagency...

Remarks at the Center for Transnational Legal Studies Seminar on the Impact of U.S. Regulatory Reform on Global Banks, New York City.

Remarks at the Risk USA 2012 Conference, New York City.

Remarks at the 2011 Bretton Woods Committee International Council Meeting, Washington, D.C.>

Opening remarks at the Global Association of Risk Professionals Forum, New York City.

Motivated by individuals' emotional response to risk at different time horizons, we model an 'anxious' agent--one who is more risk averse with respect to imminent risks than distant risks. Such preferences describe well-documented features of 1) individual behavior, 2) equilibrium prices, and 3)...

Financial engineering offers the potential to significantly reduce the consumption fluctuations faced by individuals, households, and firms. Yet much of this potential remains unfulfilled. This paper studies the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product designed to compensate...