In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...

We provide an overview of data requirements necessary to monitor repurchase agreements (repos) and securities lending (sec lending) markets for the purposes of informing policymakers and researchers about firm-level and systemic risk. We start by explaining the functioning of these markets, and...

Theories of systemic risk suggest that financial intermediaries’ balance-sheet constraints amplify fundamental shocks. We provide supporting evidence for such theories by decomposing the U.S. dollar risk premium into components associated with macroeconomic fundamentals and a component...

Remarks at the New York Bankers Association Financial Services Forum, New York City.

Remarks at the Global Association of Risk Professionals 12th Annual Risk Management Convention, New York City.

Remarks at the Partnership for New York City Discussion, New York City.

Testimony before the Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of Representatives.