Remarks at the New York Bankers Association Financial Services Forum, New York City.

Introductory Remarks for the Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Heller-Hurwicz Economics Institute and the Economic Club of Minnesota at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

We provide a framework for monitoring the shadow banking system. The shadow banking system consists of a web of specialized financial institutions that conduct credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation without direct, explicit access to public backstops. The lack of such access to sources...

Remarks at 2013 Resolution Conference: Planning for the Orderly Resolution of a Global Systemically Important Bank, Washington, D.C.

Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue, Brussels, Belgium.

Remarks at the Foreign Policy Association Corporate Dinner, New York City

We define CoVaR as the value at risk (VaR) of financial institutions conditional on other institutions being in distress. The increase of CoVaR relative to VaR measures spillover risk among institutions. We estimate CoVaR using quantile regressions and document significant CoVaR increases among...

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...