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Mailath, George J.; Mester, Loretta J. - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005717290

Bank capitalization and cost: evidence of scale economies in risk management and signaling

Hughes, Joseph P.; Mester, Loretta J. - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia - 1997

financial capital so that it can logically serve as a cushion against insolvency for potentially risk-averse managers and as a … signal of risk for less informed outsiders. This allows scale economies to be computed without assuming that the bank chooses … authors find evidence that bank managers are risk averse and use the level of financial capital to signal the level of risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005389658

The effect of implicit deposit insurance on banks portfolio choices with an application to international `overexposure'

Penati, Alessandro; Protopapadakis, Aris - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia - 1986

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005389521

Bank equity stakes in borrowing firms and financial distress

Berlin, Mitchell; John, Kose; Saunders, Anthony - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia - 1995

The authors derive optimal financial claim for a bank when the borrowing firm's uninformed stakeholders depend on the bank to establish whether the firm is distressed and whether concessions by stakeholders are necessary. The bank's financial claim is designed to ensure that it cannot collude...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005389670

Optimal financial contracts for large investors: the role of lender liability

Berlin, Mitchell; Mester, Loretta J. - Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia - 2000

This paper explores the optimal financial contract for a large investor with potential control over a firm's investment decisions. The authors show that an optimally designed menu of claims for a large investor will include features resembling a U.S. version of lender liability doctrine,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005389742