We show that a competitive banking system is inconsistent with an optimum quantity of private money. Because bankers cannot commit to their promises and the composition of their assets is not publicly observable, a positive franchise value is required to induce the full convertibility of bank...

A primary concern in monetary economics is whether a purely private monetary regime is consistent with macroeconomic stability. I show that a competitive regime is inherently unstable due to the properties of endogenously determined limits on private money creation. Precisely, there is a...

Supersedes Working Paper 13-32/R. Monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the benefits of fractional reserve banking, such as the ability to undertake more profitable (long-term) investment opportunities, and the difficulties associated with it, such as the risk of in-solvency...

This paper develops a dynamic theory of money and banking that explains why banks need to hold an illiquid portfolio to provide socially optimal transaction and liquidity services, opening the door to the possibility of equilibrium banking panics. Following a widespread liquidation of banking...

The literature on optimal monetary policy in New Keynesian models under both commitment and discretion usually solves for the optimal allocations that are consistent with a rational expectations market equilibrium, but it does not study whether the policy can be implemented given the available...

Optimal monetary policy for an economy with seasonal fluctuations and a cash-in-advance requirement on the purchase of consumption goods is studied. It is shown that the short delay in the availability of newly acquired funds for consumption purchases (the hallmark of cash-in-advance models)...