Showing 1 - 10 of 11
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012619886
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) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is … necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice … correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011258792
Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731204
This paper analyzes the possibility of irnplementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisins and the hypotesis of agents' behaviour consiclered in the Nash equilibriurn concept . We analyze the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731341
messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation … problem into a signaling game. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different … restrictions on the planner's out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We compare our results to standard results on Nash implementation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731405
technology. By studying the dynamics of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement Deere it is found that many developing … that during the implementation phase of the TRIPS Agreement many developing nations have not acted in the best of their own …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108907
This paper considers the problem of implementing constrained Walrasian allocations for exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many agents. The mechanism we provide is a feasible and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111916
In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515885
This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515906