Similar Search Results

Bella, Giovanni - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

The aim of this paper is to present a search model in the field of environmental economics, where so-called clean and dirty producers enter the trading market, both looking for a partner with whom to exchange the goods they are endowed with. The model derived in this paper is rather simple....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502111

Fatter Attraction: Marital Status and the Relationship between BMI and Labor Supply

Oreffice, Sonia; Quintana-Domeque, Climent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

or for married women. We suggest a marriage market mechanism through which male BMI and earnings are positively related … traits are more relevant in the marriage market than the corresponding male traits. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489580

A Measure to Compare Matchings in Marriage Markets

Biermann, Florian M. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

In matching markets the number of blocking pairs is often used as a criterion to compare matchings. We argue that this … changes, nor will it capture the satisfaction of the players with the matching. As an alternative, we set up two principles … objection against the given matching according to a bargaining set characterization of the set of stable matchings. We prove …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131103

Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets

Kushnir, Alexey - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674340

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Haeringer, Guillaume; Calsamiglia, Caterina; Klijn, Flip - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008015

Feasibility Constraints and Protective Behavior in Efficient Kidney Exchange

Nicoló, Antonio; Álvarez, Carmelo Rodríguez - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

We propose a model of Kidney-Exchange that incorporates the main European institutional features. We assume that patients do not consider all compatible kidneys homogeneous and patients are endowed with reservation values over the minimal quality of the kidney they may receive. Under feasibility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008042

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

game. Conversely, the set of repeated matching (or social) equilibria also includes some plays that are not part of any … definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090

How (not) to Choose Peers in Studying Groups

Gall, Thomas; Amann, Roland - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

This paper analyzes social group formation when agents are subject to peer effects within groups increasing human capital and instantaneous utility. When agents are heterogeneous on two dimensions, ability and social skills, and monetary payments are not feasible the model predicts segregation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570263

A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems

Lahiri, Somdeb - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990064