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Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474

Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals

Chand, A.K.S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833919

In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents

Ule, Aljaž; Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423187

Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

Querou, Nicolas; Beal, Sylvain - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385381

Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance Solvable Games

Mengel, Friederike; Sciubba, Emanuela - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We study extrapolation between games in a laboratory experiment. Participants in our experiment first play either the dominance solvable guessing game or a Coordination version of the guessing game for five rounds. Afterwards they play a 3x3 normal form game for ten rounds with random matching...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828406

International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty: Does the Veil of Uncertainty Help?

Finus, Michael; Pintassilgo, Pedro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified … a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only no and full learning … but also partial learning. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465547

Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game

Deissenberg, Christophe; Dawid, Herbert; Sevcik, Pavel - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423072

Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds

Jackson, Matthew O.; Golub, Benjamin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

We study learning and influence in a setting where agents communicate according to an arbitrary social network and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423267

The Cost of Segregation in Social Networks

Allouch, Nizar - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

This paper investigates the private provision of public goods in segregated societies. While most research agrees that segregation undermines public provision, the findings are mixed for private provision: social interactions, being strong within groups and limited across groups, may either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904919

Modesty Pays: Sometimes!

Finus, Michael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385341

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