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Weather Impacts On Natural, Social And Economic System (WISE) Part II: Individual Perception of Climate Extremes in Italy

Galeotti, Marzio; Goria, Alessandra; Mombrini, Paolo; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

individuals’ perception of climate extremes based on results from individuals’ surveys. In this paper is considered the study of … the perception of weather impacts through questionnaire survey to the general public. With regard to the individuals …’ perception survey, a sample of 300 individuals were interviewed by telephone: 150 extracted from the North of Italy and 150 from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570300

Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period

Stadelmann, David; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904923

Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

Querou, Nicolas; Beal, Sylvain - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385381

Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385424

Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game

Deissenberg, Christophe; Dawid, Herbert; Sevcik, Pavel - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423072

Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423217

Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds

Jackson, Matthew O.; Golub, Benjamin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

We study learning and influence in a setting where agents communicate according to an arbitrary social network and naïvely update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors’ opinions. A focus is on conditions under which beliefs of all agents in large societies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423267

A Search Model for Joint Implementation

Bella, Giovanni - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

The aim of this paper is to present a search model in the field of environmental economics, where so-called clean and dirty producers enter the trading market, both looking for a partner with whom to exchange the goods they are endowed with. The model derived in this paper is rather simple....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502111

Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric information on Private Environmental Benefits

Anthon, Signe; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423251

(Self-) Enforcement of Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism Contracts

Janssen, Josef - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 1999

International climate protection investments (Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects) are burdened with problems of contract enforcement, which prevent the realisation of efficiency gains associated with these investments. The paper analyses this problem from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385449

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