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Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values

Forges, Françoise; Orzach, Ram - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674341

Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability

Escrihuela-Villar, Marc - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this …, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385360

Auctions with Financial Externalities

Maasland, Emiel; Onderstal, Sander - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study sealed-bid auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers’ utilities depend on how much …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385448

Optimal Procurement Auction for a Buyer with Downward Sloping Demand: More Simple Economics

Burguet, Roberto - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A buyer with downward slopping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385465

Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information

Alvarez, Francisco; André, Francisco J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833916

Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price

Stryszowska, Marta - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

Internet auctions, such as those on eBay, are known for multiple bidding and sniping. Buyers send bids in the closing … both sniping and multiple bidding. By submitting multiple bids, buyers co-ordinate between auctions, so that all objects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990053

Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements

Moretto, Michele; Dosi, Cesare - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012139

Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

Sade, Orly; Schnitzlein, Charles; Zender, Jaime F. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423057

Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions

Levin, Jonathan; Athey, Susan; Seira, Enrique - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U ….S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more … extends the theory of private value auctions with heterogeneous bidders to capture participation decisions, that can account …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423075

Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility

Moretto, Michele; Dosi, Cesare - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model where firms report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the concession fee paid to the government. Two alternative bidding rules are considered in this paper. One rule consists of awarding the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423112