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Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders
Madestam, Andreas - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
I study the coexistence of formal and informal finance in underdeveloped credit markets. While weak institutions constrain formal banks, shallow pockets hamper informal lenders. In such economies, informal finance has two effects. By increasing the investment return it decreases borrowers’...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987238
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Estimating Feedback Effect in Technical Change: A Frontier Approach
Otto, Vincent M.; Kuosmanen, Timo; Ierland, Ekko C. van - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
this feedback effect by using the technical-change component of the Malmquist productivity index. This approach can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385380
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Vertical Integration and Investor Protection in Developing Countries
Macchiavello, Rocco - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small, financially constrained firms. This paper asks whether vertical integration relaxes those financial constraints. It shows that vertical integration trades off the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502126
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Development Accounting with Intermediate Goods
Grobovšek, Jan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
Do intermediate goods help explain relative and aggregate productivity differences across countries? Three observations … depresses aggregate productivity and increases the price ratio of final goods to services. Applying the model to data for middle … intermediate production efficiency of the US, the aggregate productivity gap between the lowest and highest income countries in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421237
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Spatial Climate-Economic Models in the Design of Optimal Climate Policies Across Locations
Brock, William A.; Engström, Gustav; Xepapadeas, Anastasios - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
We couple a one-dimensional energy balance climate model with heat transportation across latitudes, with an economic growth model. We derive temperature and damage distributions across locations and optimal taxes on fossil fuels which, in contrast to zero-dimensional Integrated Assessment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603763
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Pairing Games and Markets
Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781883
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Bargaining and Delay in Trading Networks
Bedayo, Mikel; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904918
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Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results
Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
In has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom thy identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self-interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385424
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Bilateral Commitment
Haeringer, Guillaume; Bade, Sophie; Renou, Ludovic - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385463
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Optimal Conservation Policy Under Imperfect Intergenerational Altruism
Corato, Luca Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
In this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421232