Similar Search Results

North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme

Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille; Poudou, Jean-Christophe; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

+ (REDD+) scheme as a contractual relationship between countries in the light of the theory of incentives. Considering …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603765

A Theory of Firm Decline

Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas; Giannatal, Sonia Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465540

Social Incentives Matter: Evidence from an Online Real Effort Experiment

Tonin, Mirco; Vlassopoulos, Michael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

incentives - that take the form of a donation received by a charity of the subject's choice - to financial incentives using an … online real effort experiment. We find that social incentives lead to a 20% rise in productivity, regardless of their form … (lump sum or related to performance) or strength. When subjects can choose the mix of incentives half sacrifice some of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904903

Executive Compensation: Facts

Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465539

Regulating the Environmental Consequences of Preferences for Social Status within an Evolutionary Framework

Sartzetakis, Eftichios S.; Xepapadeas, Anastasios; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2015

Taking as given that we are consuming too much and that overconsumption leads to environmental degradation, the present paper examines the regulator's choices between informative advertisement and consumption taxation. We model overconsumption by considering individuals that care about social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268594

Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands: Information Problems and Regulatory Choices

Lin, Tun; Goeschl, Timo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This survey paper examines various information insufficiencies in biodiversity conservation and their impact of regulatory choices. We surveyed the literature in the field and identified four major types of informational insufficiencies in making efficient biodiversity conservation decisions: 1)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385328

Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited

Mensink, Paul - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost information under the non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385420

Monopoly with Resale

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders resale, where the winner in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385437

Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474

Endogenous Price Mechanisms,Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and Evidence

Guerriero, Carmine - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

This paper analyzes the constitutional determinants of cost reimbursement rules. In order to design the optimal incentive schemes, a possibly partisan planner will take into account the market cost structure, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchical structure and its technology....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385490