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Civic Capital and the Size Distribution of Plants: Short-Run Dynamics and Long-Run Equilibrium

Bürker, Matthias; Minerva, G. Alfredo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

We characterize how the size distribution of plants, within narrowly defined industries, changed in Italy over a ten-year time span, and relate this to the stock of civic capital at the provincial level. Data on plant size come from the 1991 and 2001 Italian censuses. Civic capital turns out to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904924

Vertical Integration and Investor Protection in Developing Countries

Macchiavello, Rocco - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by the pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small, financially constrained firms. This paper asks whether vertical integration relaxes those financial constraints. It shows that vertical integration trades off the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502126

Dynamic Multilateral Markets

Polanski, Arnold; Lazarova, Emiliya A. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

endogenously the equilibrium firm size and remuneration scheme. We find that each worker type in a stationary market equilibrium is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131110

Spying in Multi-market Oligopolies

Billand, Pascal; Bravard, Christophe; Chakrabarti, Subhadip - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674337

R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly

Zikos, Vasileios - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965187

R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms

Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Mauleon, Ana; Sempere-Monerris, … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423183

Labour Participation in Different Firm Organisations

Moretto, Michele; Rossini, Gianpaolo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 1999

start reviewing the literature on the LM firm. We then consider a less radical labour participation, i.e. the Aoki firm. We … survey extensions of the Aoki's firm to the case of market uncertainty, where also the question of the optimal allocation of … and owners. By and large, it appears that the degree of labour participation in decisions and rent sharing in a firm is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423250

Firms’ International Status and Heterogeneity in Performance: Evidence From Italy

Minerva, Alfredo; Casaburi, Lorenzo; Gattai, Valeria - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

2001-2003) retrieving firm level data for roughly 7,000 units. Three results stand out from our empirical exercise. First …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423274

Cost-Reducing Alliances and Local Spillovers

Deroian, Frédéric - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

Firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other, but cannot fully internalize the shared knowledge. When spillovers are local and transit through the network of alliances, stable architectures with a moderate level of asymmetry are identified.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570370

Using the Law to Change the Custom

Aldashev, Gani; Chaara, Imane; Platteau, Jean-Philippe; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We build a simple model of legal dualism in which a pro-poor legal reform, under certain conditions, causes the conflicting custom to go some way toward producing the change intended by the legislator. It then acts as an "outside anchor" that exerts a "magnet effect" on the custom. We illustrate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642161