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Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak … conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power configuration which is stable with respect to renegotiations. We further … different bargaining solutions on apex games and show under which conditions there are core stable coalitions. Finally, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833942

Group Bargaining and Conflict

Quérou, Nicolas - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation of a surplus (which is used to fund group specific goods). Each group is composed of agents who have differing valuations for public goods. Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf. Specifically,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674333

Strategic Network Interdiction

Hong, Sunghoon - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131109

Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement

Ray, Debraj; Eliaz, Kfir; Razin, Ronny - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A model of group decision-making is studied, in which one of two alternatives must be chosen. While group members differ in their valuations of the alternatives, everybody prefers some alternative to disagreement. Our model is distinguished by three features: private information regarding...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423100

Evaluation of Parties and Coalitions After Parliamentary Elections

Tangian, Andranik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

Five leading German political parties and their coalitions are evaluated with regard to party manifestos and results of the 2005 parliamentary elections. For this purpose, the party manifestos are converted into Yes/No answers to 95 topical questions (Relax the protection against dismissals?...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423116

Coalitional Matchings

Dimitrov, Dinko; Lazarova, Emiliya - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423256

Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter

Revilla, Pablo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385415

Measurement and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in Sydney

Lalich, Walter F. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

This paper analyses the contribution to the creation of a culturally diverse Sydney landscape by ethnic communities following the arrival of over a million and half non-English speaking settlers since 1948. Through fragmented collective actions, around 450 communal places were established to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385486

United We Vote

Eguia, Jon X. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385504

Paths to Stability in Two-sided Matching with Uncertainty

Lazarova, Emiliya; Dimitrov, Dinko - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the “name” but not the ”type” of the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904912