In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the...

We consider a robust control model for a spatially distributed commercial fishery under uncertainty, and in particular a tracking problem, i.e. the problem of robust stabilization of a chosen deterministic benchmark state in the presence of model uncertainty. The problem is expressed in the form...

This paper adapts Turing analysis and applies it to dynamic bioeconomic problems where the interaction of coupled economic and ecological dynamics over space endogenously creates (or destroys) spatial heterogeneity. It also extends Turing analysis to standard recursive optimal control frameworks...

This paper investigates the relative economic and environmental outcomes of price versus quantity mechanisms to control GHG emissions when abatement costs are uncertain. In particular, we evaluate the impacts on policy costs, CO2 emissions and energy R&D for a stringent mitigation target of 550...

Standard economic models of groundwater management impose restrictive assumptions regarding perfect transmissivity (i.e., the aquifer behaves as a bathtub), no external effects of groundwater stocks, observability of individual extraction rates, and/or homogenous agents. In this article, we...

This paper extends Turing analysis to standard recursive optimal control frameworks in economics and applies it to dynamic bioeconomic problems where the interaction of coupled economic and ecological dynamics under optimal control over space creates (or destroys) spatial heterogeneity. We show...

The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a...

This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the...

The present stalemate in climate negotiations has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on...

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the ”coalition unanimity” game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game...