Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 76
Cover Image
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
Barbera, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230814
Cover Image
Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period
Stadelmann, David; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904923
Cover Image
United We Vote
Eguia, Jon X. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and … the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine … whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385504
Cover Image
Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation
Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Berghammer, Rudolf; Swart, Harrie de - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
A stable government is by definition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230883
Cover Image
Paths to Stability in Two-sided Matching with Uncertainty
Lazarova, Emiliya; Dimitrov, Dinko - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the “name” but not the ”type” of the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904912
Cover Image
Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter
Revilla, Pablo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007
This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385415
Cover Image
Measurement and Spatial Effects of the Immigrant Created Cultural Diversity in Sydney
Lalich, Walter F. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
This paper analyses the contribution to the creation of a culturally diverse Sydney landscape by ethnic communities following the arrival of over a million and half non-English speaking settlers since 1948. Through fragmented collective actions, around 450 communal places were established to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385486
Cover Image
Bargaining and Power
Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833942
Cover Image
Sequential Sharing Rules for River Sharing Problems
Ansink, Erik; Weikard, Hans-Peter - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
We analyse the redistribution of a resource among agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489602
Cover Image
Reallocating Water: An Application of Sequent
Ansink, Erik; Marchiori, Carmen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
We present an axiomatic approach to the reallocation of water rights among economic sectors. Reallocation may be appropriate when the current schedule of water allocation is considered unfair. Our proposed approach is based on the combination of initial water rights, sectors' claims to water,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489614