Showing 1 - 10 of 178
. We approach this omission by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. This yields … general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be “too dense” in a well …-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities tend to induce “too dense” networks. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008043
encompasses many economic models with externalities and outside options. We show that when outside options are pure (i …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394
We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous … sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230849
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674336
Na and Shin (1998) showed that the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified research efforts worldwide to reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465547
This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423240
This paper examines stability of international climate agreements for carbon abatement under an optimal transfer rule and renegotiations. The optimal transfer rule suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (Weikard 2005, Carraro, Eyckmans and Finus 2006) is no longer optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230859
the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either … case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point …In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385392
paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second … independently from the identity of the winner. We prove that the first-price auction is not affected by this kind of price-externalities … by the presence of such price-externalities. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423117
This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost information under the non-linear pollution tax scheme (‘differential tax’) introduced by Kim and Chang [J. Regul. Econom. 5, 1993, 193-197]. It shows that polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385420