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Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period

Stadelmann, David; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904923

On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union

Barbera, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230814

Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Zeeuw, Aart de - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423147

R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms

Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Mauleon, Ana; Sempere-Monerris, … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423183

Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

companion paper we characterised how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to … exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423217

Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423234

Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

question we use the framework of games with incomplete information. For a given game we first put a lower bound on e so that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385424

Bilateral Commitment

Haeringer, Guillaume; Bade, Sophie; Renou, Ludovic - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385463

The Formation of Financial Networks

Babus, Ana - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

Modern banking systems are highly interconnected. Despite their various benefits, the linkages that exist between banks carry the risk of contagion. In this paper we investigate how banks decide on direct balance sheet linkages and the implications for contagion risk. In particular, we model a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392533

Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations

Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper analyses issue linkage as a way to increase co-operation on issues where incentives to free-ride are strong. The goal is to determine under what conditions players prefer to link negotiations on two different issues rather than to negotiate on the two issues separately. Suppose that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392534