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Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period
Stadelmann, David; Torgler, Benno - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904923
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On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
Barbera, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who … characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how … correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230814
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Bargaining and Delay in Trading Networks
Bedayo, Mikel; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904918
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Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results
Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
question we use the framework of games with incomplete information. For a given game we first put a lower bound on e so that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385424
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Bilateral Commitment
Haeringer, Guillaume; Bade, Sophie; Renou, Ludovic - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385463
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Optimal Conservation Policy Under Imperfect Intergenerational Altruism
Corato, Luca Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011
In this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421232
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Cross-Border Intellectual Property Rights: Contract Enforcement and Absorptive Capacity
Naghavi, Alireza; Tsai, Yingyi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012
This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a Nash bargaining approach and distinguishes between the outcome and its actual enforcement. The absorptive capacity of the Southern country to exploit technology transfer plays a key role in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635920
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An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities
Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489581
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Matching Markets with Signals
Kushnir, Alexey - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is a job market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information between firms and workers and show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008014
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Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks
Fosco, Constanza; Mengel, Friederike - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008019