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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090

Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games

Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

The class of games with one apex player is generalized to the class of games with a collection of apex sets. These … simple games, together with a power index, canonically induce a hedonic coalition formation game. A monotonicity property of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904935

The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385367

Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core

Dimitrov, Dinko; Haake, Claus-Jochen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385389

Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

Tulkens, Henry; Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385392

Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options

Bloch, Francis; Gomes, Armando - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394

Instant Efficient Pollution Abatement under Non-Linear Taxation and Asymmetric Information: The Differential Tax Revisited

Mensink, Paul - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper analyzes incentives for polluting firms to exchange abatement cost information under the non-linear pollution tax scheme (‘differential tax’) introduced by Kim and Chang [J. Regul. Econom. 5, 1993, 193-197]. It shows that polluting firms have - under mild conditions - an incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385420

Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems

Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

pairwise stability when group deviations are allowed. Group deviations are defined in graphs on the set of agents. We introduce …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385430

The Egalitarian Sharing Rule in Provision of Public Projects

Savvateev, Alexei; Bogomolnaia, Anna; Breton, Michel Le; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385438

Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational Appraisal

Bréchet, Thierry; Gerard, François - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385509