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agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this …, they risk that collusion completely collapses, as remaining cartel members are unable to sustain collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385360
dimension of the fringe such that collusion is a Nash equilibrium of the static game. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423128
affected by tacit collusion or price manipulation when the corresponding polluting product market is oligopolistic. We analyze …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011162046
We provide evidence suggesting that incumbents' access to group deep pockets has a negative impact on entry in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set on business groups, our paper presents three major findings. First, the amount of cash holdings owned by incumbent-affiliated groups...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502107
This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502110
An important conclusion from the literature on hydropower is that if there are no other constraints than the available water reservoirs for a year, and operating costs are ignored, the competitive (and socially optimal) outcome is characterized by the (present value) price being constant through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385330
In this paper we extend the model of vertical product differentiation to also consider information disparities about the extent of quality differences. Equilibrium prices turn out to depend not only on the share of informed consumers but also on uninformed consumers beliefs about quality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385350
We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833916
This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010757692
This paper explores optimal environmental tax policy under which duopoly firms strategically choose the location of their plants in a simple three-stage game. We examine how the relationship between the optimal emission tax and the choice of location of duopoly firms affects the welfare of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008489579