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Currarini, Sergio; Menge, Friederike - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park Campus and Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552188

Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures

Aldy, Joseph E.; Barrett, Scott; Stavins, Robert N. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

global climate change. We employ six criteria to evaluate the policy proposals: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency …, cost effectiveness, equity, flexibility in the presence of new information, and incentives for participation and compliance … environmental outcome and efficiency, and between cost-effectiveness and incentives for participation and compliance. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423122

The Stability of Exchange Networks

Dogan, Gönül; Assen, M.A.L.M. van; Rijt, Arnout van de; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

This paper develops a formal model of exchange network stability that combines expected value theory (Friedkin 1995) with the economic literature on network dynamics. We identify stable networks up to size 8 for varying costs and investigate whether they are Pareto efficient and egalitarian....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230832

Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation

Mantovani, Marco; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Mauleon, Ana; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

agents are farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131101

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Haeringer, Guillaume; Calsamiglia, Caterina; Klijn, Flip - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008015

Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements

Dietz, Simon; Marchiori, Carmen; Tavoni, Alessandro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904936

International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems

Finus, Micheal - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385371

Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol

Carraro, Carlo; Buchner, Barbara - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

The present stalemate in climate negotiations has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385383

Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

Tulkens, Henry; Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point … efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett’s (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385392

Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies

Marini, Marco; Currarini, Sergio - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the ”coalition unanimity” game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385412