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Maasland, Emiel; Onderstal, Sander - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study sealed-bid auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers’ utilities depend on how much …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385448

Optimal Procurement Auction for a Buyer with Downward Sloping Demand: More Simple Economics

Burguet, Roberto - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A buyer with downward slopping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385465

Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information

Alvarez, Francisco; André, Francisco J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833916

Late and Multiple Bidding in Competing Second Price

Stryszowska, Marta - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

Internet auctions, such as those on eBay, are known for multiple bidding and sniping. Buyers send bids in the closing … both sniping and multiple bidding. By submitting multiple bids, buyers co-ordinate between auctions, so that all objects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990053

Auctioning Monopoly Franchises: Award Criteria and Service Launch Requirements

Moretto, Michele; Dosi, Cesare - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012139

Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

Sade, Orly; Schnitzlein, Charles; Zender, Jaime F. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than are the uniform-price auctions, and so contrary to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423057

Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions

Levin, Jonathan; Athey, Susan; Seira, Enrique - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U ….S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more … extends the theory of private value auctions with heterogeneous bidders to capture participation decisions, that can account …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423075

Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility

Moretto, Michele; Dosi, Cesare - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model where firms report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the concession fee paid to the government. Two alternative bidding rules are considered in this paper. One rule consists of awarding the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423112

Bidding among Friends and Enemies

Ettinger, David - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We consider an auction setting in which potential buyers, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. First, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423117

Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values

Forges, Françoise; Orzach, Ram - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674341