Showing 1 - 10 of 168
We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We … variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link formation. One aspect is whether players can only make and receive transfers … links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392531
alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423065
the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at … symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674336
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423234
This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423240
This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385394
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the (weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for pairwise stability when group deviations are allowed. Group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385430
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385438
and coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming … networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to emerge and persist. Our main … measures, and generates a finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets of networks and coalitions, each constituting a basin …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987229