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Brusco, Sandro; Lopomo, Giuseppe; Viswanathan, S. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm’s stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423148

Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values

Forges, Françoise; Orzach, Ram - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674341

Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliate Private Values

Kadan, Ohad - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We prove the existence of an increasing equilibrium, and study the comparative statics of correlation in the k-double auction with affiliated private values. This is supposedly the simplest bilateral trading mechanism that allows for dependence in valuations between buyers and sellers. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570251

Auction Design without Commitment

Vartiainen, Hannu - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570289

Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction

Izmalkov, Sergei - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper presents an open ascending price mechanism that allocates efficiently M units of the same good among N bidders with interdependent values The mechanism consists of a number of sequential English auctions with reentry and has the following attributes. In each of the individual auctions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990057

Rationing in IPOs

Parlour, Christine A.; Rajan, Uday - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385352

Monopoly with Resale

Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders resale, where the winner in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385437

Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions

Mezzetti, Claudio; Pekec, Aleksandar; Tsetlin, Ilia - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385440

Auctions with Financial Externalities

Maasland, Emiel; Onderstal, Sander - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We study sealed-bid auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers’ utilities depend on how much the winner pays. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), larger financial externalities result in lower bids and in a lower expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385448

Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions

Keloharju, Matti; Nyborg, Kjell G.; Rydqvist, Kristian - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

auctions during the period 1992-99. Average underpricing amounts to .041% of face value. Theory suggests that underpricing may … result from monopsonistic market power. We develop and test robust implications from this theory and ¯nd that it has little … predicted by the theory. We also present evidence that the Finnish Treasury acts strategically, taking into account the fact …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385450

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