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Bargaining and Delay in Trading Networks

Bedayo, Mikel; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

trading path and the allocation of the surplus among the seller, the buyer and the intermediaries at equilibrium. We show that … single link towards a weak agent. Once agents do not know the impatience of the other agents, each bilateral bargaining … session may involve delay, but not perpetual disagreement, in equilibrium. When an agent chooses another agent on a path from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904918

Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Zeeuw, Aart de - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423147

R&D Networks Among Unionized Firms

Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Mauleon, Ana; Sempere-Monerris, … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423183

Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

companion paper we characterised how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423217

Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423234

Social Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Arbitrary Games with Incomplete Information: Some First Results

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

there exists a Nash e-equilibrium in pure strategies consistent with conformity. We also introduce a new concept of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385424

Bilateral Commitment

Haeringer, Guillaume; Bade, Sophie; Renou, Ludovic - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to commit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action profiles. We give a complete characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385463

The Formation of Financial Networks

Babus, Ana - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

banks manage to form networks that are resilient to contagion. Thus, in an equilibrium network, the probability of contagion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392533

Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations

Carraro, Carlo; Marchiori, Carmen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

trade-off within a game-theoretic framework and shows under what conditions issue linkage is players’ equilibrium strategy. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392534

A Characterization of Stochastically Stable Networks

Vannetelbosch, Vincent; Tercieux, Olivier - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

Jackson and Watts [J. of Econ. Theory 71 (2002), 44-74] have examined the dynamic formation and stochastic evolution of networks. We provide a refinement of pairwise stability, p-pairwise stability, which allows us to characterize the stochastically stable networks without requiring the "tree...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392539