Showing 1 - 10 of 187
A firm can merge with one of n potential partners. The owner of each firm has private information about both his firm’s stand-alone value and a component of the synergies that would be realized by the merger involving his firm. We characterize incentive-efficient mechanisms in two cases....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423148
from auction alternatives in recent years, despite significantly lower costs in both direct fees and initial underpricing … when using the auction mechanism. This paper shows that in the French market, where the frequency of book-building and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570254
We analyze the welfare consequences of an increase in the commissions charged by the organizer of an auction … of tax incidence in consumer economics. We argue, however, that auction markets deserve a separate treatment. Indeed we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570265
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674341
-double auction with affiliated private values. This is supposedly the simplest bilateral trading mechanism that allows for dependence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570251
We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the … commit to the English auction. Typically the converse also holds, the English auction is the only stable auction mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570289
This paper presents an open ascending price mechanism that allocates efficiently M units of the same good among N bidders with interdependent values The mechanism consists of a number of sequential English auctions with reentry and has the following attributes. In each of the individual auctions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990057
When procurement contracts are awarded through competitive tendering participating firms commit ex ante to fulfil a set of contractual duties. However, selected contractors may find profitable to renege ex post on their promises by opportunistically delivering lower quality standards. In order...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423150
would bid in a first-price auction. 3) Buyers' expected utilities in an all-pay auction are lower than in a first …-price auction. 4) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in the risk neutral case. 5 …) The seller's expected payoff in an all-pay auction may be either higher or lower than in a first-price auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570309
This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders resale, where the winner in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385437