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Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous Players
Lazarova, Emiliya; Dimitrov, Dinko - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that reflect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents' preferences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status define the two components of a generalized constant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674334
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Paths to Stability in Two-sided Matching with Uncertainty
Lazarova, Emiliya; Dimitrov, Dinko - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
We consider one-to-one matching problems under two modalities of uncertainty that differ in the way types are assigned to agents. Individuals have preferences over the possible types of the agents from the opposite market side and initially know the “name” but not the ”type” of the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904912
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Coalitional Matchings
Dimitrov, Dinko; Lazarova, Emiliya - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423256
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Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter
Revilla, Pablo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007
This paper studies many-to-one matching market in which each agent’s preferences not only depend on the institution that hires her, but also on the group of her colleagues, which are matched to the same institution. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385415
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A Weak Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems
Lahiri, Somdeb - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
result of this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set. The need for such a … choice problems, the core may be empty. We also show by means of an example that the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990064
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On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
Barbera, Salvador; Jackson, Matthew O. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004
Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230814
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Applications of Relations and Graphs to Coalition Formation
Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Berghammer, Rudolf; Swart, Harrie de - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
, graph theory, social choice and bargaining theory, and by using the computer support system RelView for computing solutions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230883
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United We Vote
Eguia, Jon X. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385504
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Bargaining and Power
Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
new power configuration which takes into account bargaining among players in coalitions. We show that under very weak … conditions on a bargaining solution there is a power configuration which is stable with respect to renegotiations. We further … different bargaining solutions on apex games and show under which conditions there are core stable coalitions. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833942
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Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation
Kilgour, Marc; Brams, Steven J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008013