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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090

Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements

Dietz, Simon; Marchiori, Carmen; Tavoni, Alessandro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

The theory of international environmental agreements overwhelmingly assumes that governments engage as unitary agents. Each government makes choices based on benefits and costs that are simple national aggregates, and similarly on a single set of national-level motivations, together drawing a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904936

International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems

Finus, Micheal - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385371

Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol

Carraro, Carlo; Buchner, Barbara - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

The present stalemate in climate negotiations has led policy analysts and economists to explore the possible emergence of alternative climate regimes. This paper explores the idea of replacing international cooperation on greenhouse gas emission control with international cooperation on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385383

Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

Tulkens, Henry; Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385392

Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies

Marini, Marco; Currarini, Sergio - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the ”coalition unanimity” game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2000). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385412

Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups

Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

A model of group formation is presented where the number of groups is fixed and a person can only join a group if the group’s members approve the person’s joining. Agents have either local status preferences (each agent wants to be the highest status agent in his group) or global status...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385469

Punish and Perish?

Antoci, Angelo; Zarri, Luca - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

The evolution of large-scale cooperation among genetic strangers is a fundamental unanswered question in the social sciences. Behavioral economics has persuasively shown that so called ‘strong reciprocity’ plays a key role in accounting for the endogenous enforcement of cooperation. Insofar...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321000

Identity, Homophily and In-Group Bias

Currarini, Sergio; Menge, Friederike - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park Campus and Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552188

Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

Ansink, Erik; Ruijs, Arjan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007

We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990049