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Investment Size and Firm’s Value Under Profit Sharing Regulation
Moretto, Michele; Panteghini, Paolo M.; Scarpa, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003
’s investment of endogenous size. Using a real option approach in continuous time, we show that profit sharing does not affect a … total investment. We also evaluate the reduction in the firm’s value due to profit sharing, linking this reduction to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423178
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Abuse of Competitive Fringe
Capuano, Carlo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
The purpose of this article is to analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe, composed by price taker firms, can affect the sustainability of collusive equilibria. Our starting point is that there exists a diffused misunderstanding about its strategical role as collusive minus factor. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423128
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Environmental Quality in a Differentiated Duopoly
Farzin, Y. Hossein; Akao, Ken-Ichi - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
In a duopoly industry with environmentally differentiated products, we examine the effects of introducing a mandatory environmental quality standard on firms’ environmental quality choices, profits, and the average environmental quality offered by the industry. We show that at low standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392562
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Regulatory Independence and Political Interference: Evidence from EU Mixed-Ownership Utilities’ Investment and Debt
Cambini, Carlo; Rondi, Laura - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
This paper examines the investment and financial decisions of a sample of 92 EU regulated utilities, taking into … account key institutional features of EU public utilities, such as: a) regulation by agencies with various degrees of … independence matters for both investment and financial decisions. Investment increases under an Independent Regulatory Agency (IRA …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465522
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Capital Structure and Regulation: Does Ownership Matter?
Cambini, Carlo; Bortolotti, Bernardo; Rondi, Laura; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2007
has a positive and significant effect on their investment levels. Our results are consistent with the theory that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423078
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Interactions between State and Federal Climate Change Policies
Goulder, Lawrence H.; Stavins, Robert N. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010
Federal action addressing climate change is likely to emerge either through new legislation or via the U.S. EPA’s authority under the Clean Air Act. The prospect of federal action raises important questions regarding the interconnections between federal efforts and state-level climate policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642159
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On Regulation and Competition: Pros and Cons of a Diversified Monopolist
Scarpa, Carlo; Calzolari, Giacomo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
We study the regulation of a firm which supplies a regulated service while also operating in a competitive, unregulated … (with price and quantity competition) and optimal regulation that involves an informational externality to the competitors …. Although joint conduct of the activities generates scope economies, it also entails private information, so that regulation is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008048
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On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods
Bierbrauer, Felix - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009
The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502099
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Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence
Guerriero, Carmine - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006
This paper analyzes the effects of supervisors’ (i.e., regulators and judges) selection rules on regulated prices. A checks and balances’ regulatory review process strengthens the role of the judicial power and election increases the populism of implicitly motivated supervisors. Election...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230838
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Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory and Evidence
Guerriero, Carmine - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008
regulators are more likely the less efficient is the information-gathering technology, the less stringent are the investment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230941