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Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks

Fosco, Constanza; Mengel, Friederike - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in Prisoners’ Dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-based imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008019

The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure and Renewable Resource Management

Tavoni, Alessandro; Schlüter, Maja; Levin, Simon - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674345

Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution

Perez, Wilson - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385474

Oil Revenues, Ethnic Fragmentation and Political Transition of Authoritarian Regimes

Cologni, Alessandro; Manera, Matteo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

Natural resources are generally associated to negative effects on the political environment of a country. This paper explores the impact that oil revenues have on the establishment of a given political system. Based on previous literature, a political economy perspective is employed. A simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541202

River Sharing and Water Trade

Ansink, Erik; Gengenbach, Michael; Weikard, Hans-Peter - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541206

The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering the Trade-off between Equality and Efficiency

Farvaque, Etienne; Mihailov, Alexander; Naghavi, Alireza - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

This paper aims to explain the rise and fall of communism by exploring the interplay between economic incentives and social preferences in different economic systems. We introduce inequality-averse and inefficiency-averse agents responding to economic incentives and transmitting their ideology...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320986

Rent Seeking and Power Hierarchies: A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation with Antagonistic Links

Huremovic, Kenan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

Network structure has a significant role in determining the outcomes of many socioeconomic relationships, including the antagonistic ones. In this paper we study a situation in which agents, embedded in a network, simultaneously play interrelated bilateral contest games with their neighbors....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833896

Sharing R&D Investments in Cleaner Technologies to Mitigate Climate Change

El-Sayed, Abeer; Rubio, Santiago J. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international … cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to … spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010833931

Rent Seekers in Rentier States: When Greed Brings Peace

Bjorvatn, Kjetil; Naghavi, Alireza - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

Are natural resources a source of conflict or stability? Empirical studies demonstrate that rents from natural resources, and in particular oil, are an important source of civil war. Allegedly, resource rents attract rent seekers, which destabilize society. However, there is a large literature...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008467319

Building Up Social Capital in a Changing World: A Network Approach

Vega-Redondo, Fernando - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

playing partners but, crucially, also determines how relevant strategic information diffuses or new cooperation opportunities …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423105