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Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas; Giannatal, Sonia Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465540

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters’ Turnout?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of … contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players …, job promotion competitions, or sport contests. We study the general model of contest with attacks and defence and propose …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990068

Bidding for Conservation Contracts

Corato, Luca Di; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

require long-term commitments. Landowners, however, can decide to prematurely terminate the contract when the opportunity cost … views non-enforcement of contract terms as a source of real-options, the paper offers the following contributions. First, it … play in avoiding such potential bias in contract allocation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813790

Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services

Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230837

Procurement with Unenforceable Contract Time and the Law of Liquidated Damages

Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

. By exploiting the real-option approach, we examine how the inability to force sellers to meet the contract time … when the contract does not provide for any compensation for late-delivery. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010555588

Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks

Hiller, Timo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131100

On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players

Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

Motivated by issues of imitation, learning and evolution, we introduce a framework of non-co-operative games, allowing both countable sets of pure actions and player types and player types and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423046

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423048

Allocation Rules for Network Games

Jackson, Matthew O. - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423065

How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423070