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Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas; Giannatal, Sonia Di - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter’s operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465540

Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters’ Turnout?

Soubeyran, Raphaël - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of … contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players …, job promotion competitions, or sport contests. We study the general model of contest with attacks and defence and propose …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990068

Procurement with Unenforceable Contract Time and the Law of Liquidated Damages

Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

. By exploiting the real-option approach, we examine how the inability to force sellers to meet the contract time … when the contract does not provide for any compensation for late-delivery. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010555588

Bidding for Conservation Contracts

Corato, Luca Di; Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014

require long-term commitments. Landowners, however, can decide to prematurely terminate the contract when the opportunity cost … views non-enforcement of contract terms as a source of real-options, the paper offers the following contributions. First, it … play in avoiding such potential bias in contract allocation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813790

Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks

Hiller, Timo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with more allies obtains...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009131100

Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services

Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230837

The Cost of Segregation in Social Networks

Allouch, Nizar - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

This paper investigates the private provision of public goods in segregated societies. While most research agrees that segregation undermines public provision, the findings are mixed for private provision: social interactions, being strong within groups and limited across groups, may either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904919

Modesty Pays: Sometimes!

Finus, Michael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385341

Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage

Gautier, Pascal; Soubeyran, Raphael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385348

Bounded Rationality and Repeated Network Formation

Querou, Nicolas; Beal, Sylvain - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385381

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